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Philip C. A l m o n d , Department of Studies in Religion, University of Queensland,
St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia 4067
Much has been written about the relationship between Rudolf Otto's
mature philosophy of religion and bis commitment to that philosophical
tradition inaugurated by Immanuel Kant. Yet, a considerable lack of clarity
still remains over the question of the extent to which Otto's commitment in
the first decade of this Century to a version of Kantianism originally
expounded by Jakob Fries (1773—1843) permeates the work for which
Otto is most widely renowned, Das Heilige.1 In this article, I hope to
demonstrate that Otto's commitment to Friesianism plays a much greater
role in Das Heilige, especially in the structural framework of Otto's
account of the Holy, than has previously been thought to be the case, not
only of its more overtly philosophical parts, but of its apparently
phenomenological parts also.
Continuity and Discontinuity
An essential part of this task is the resolution of the problem of the
continuity of Otto's work — both within Das Heilige itself, and between it
äs a whole and the earlier parts of Otto's work, especially his Kantisch-
Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie2 in 1909. For how we perceive his philoso-
phy of religion in Das Heiligey and his notion of the a priori category of the
Holy in particular, depends upon whether we find an overall continuity or
discontinuity within the corpus äs a whole.
The first of these issues, that of the continuity within Das Heilige
itself, is certainly a contentious one. It has, for instance, been maintained
that between the first part of Das Heilige and the more formal philosophical
parts which begin (in the English translation) with chapter fourteen, there is
a sharp break.3 And in general, one can say that the more the critic values
the phenomenological analyses of the first thirteen or so chapters, the more
inclined he is to see a sharp transition from these to philosophical concerns
and, moreover, to devalue the latter. Edmund Husserl, for example, sees it
äs a first beginning for a phenomenology of religion. But he nonetheless
concludes that 'The metaphysician (theologian) in Mr. Otto has, it seems to
1
 R. Otto, Das Heilige (Breslau: Trewendt und Granier, 1917); English translation, The Idea
of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1923).
2
 R. Otto, Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1909); Eng-
glish translation, The Philosophy of Religion (London: Williams and Norgate, 1931).
3
 See P. Seifen, Die Religionsphilosophie bei Rudolf Otto (Düsseldorf: G. H. Nolte, 1936),
pp.90f.
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me, carried Otto the phenomenologist away on bis wings'.4 Otto's former
teacher Theodor Häring, to whom Otto had dedicated Das Heilige, wrote
in 1918 to Otto in a similar vein: "The Interpretation of the *a priori' äs a
'predisposition' in the Friesian sense seems to me independent of the value
of your investigation of the numinous".5 (Though he does go on to say that
he finds Otto's Interpretation of the religious a priori clearer than that of
Ernst Troeltsch). And Paul Tillich too, while applauding Otto's account of
the non-rational core of religion, finds that with the second half of the Book
'a series of unresolved problems remain which demand further work'.6
Certainly, when one examines the history of the Interpretation of the Book,
and especially among its English-speaking critics, it has been the
phenomenological superstructure, so to speak, rather than its philosophical
base which has guaranteed its place in the history of the science of religion.
Be that äs it may, it must nonetheless be recognized that the explicit
philosophy of religion in Das Heilige develops, in a systematic way, certain
ideas alluded to or merely implied in the earlier parts of the work; ideas
which, äs we shall see, subtly but significantly influence the apparently
purely phenomenological account. As Theodor Siegfried rightly points out:
The exposition of Otto is made too simplistic if the delicate feeling and literary power,
the masterly skill of analysis and depth of vision are extolled, but the systematic
conceptual content is passed over in silence.7
Certainly, and most importantly, Otto himself sees the conceptual
aspects of Das Heilige äs central to the purpose of the book. For Otto was
in no sense an irrationalist in his approach to religion:
On no account do I wish to be considered a 'non-rationalist'. In all religion, and in my
own religion, I indeed recognise the profundity of the non-rational factor; but this
deepens my conviction that it is the duty of serious theology to win äs much ground äs it
can for Ratio in this realm.8
And in his Foreword to the English edition of Das Heilige, he
remarks, feel that no-one ought to concern himself with the "Numen
ineffabile" who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the
E. Husserl in a letter to Otto on 5.3. 1919: Rudolf Otto Nachlaß, Universitätsbibliothek
Marburg, Hs. 797 : 794.
Quoted by H. W. Schütte, Religion und Christentum in der Theologie Rudolf Ottos (Berlin:
De Gruyter & Co., 1969), p. 129.
P. Tillich, »Die Kategorie des >Heil igen< bei Rudolf Otto«, Theologische Blätter, vol. 2,
1923, p. 11.
Th. Siegfried, »Nachwort* to R. Otto, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit (Tübingen: J.C.B.
Mohr [Paul SiebeckJ, 1940), p. 33.
>Anmerkungen Rudolf Ottos zu der englischen Übersetzung der Kantisch-Fries'schen
Religionsphilosophie: The Philosophy of Religion, London 1931<, H.W. Schütte, op.cit.,
p. 123. J.W. Harvey reports also that Otto always held that the Barthian doctrine of the
'wholly otherness' of God was 'a one-sided aberration'. See Harvey's obituary for Otto,
The Fnend, 19.3.37 (Rudolf Otto Archiv, Religionskundliche Sammlung, Marburg, 560).
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"Ratio aeterna"'.9 There are some grounds therefore, for being wary of too
hasty an assertion of discontinuity within Das Heilige.
The related claim, that there is a radical discontinuity between Das
Heilige and Otto's earlier work, ought also to be treated cautiously.10
Undoubtedly, at its first appearance, Das Heilige was startlingly fresh and
exciting to many of its readers; Adolf Harnack, for example, compared it in
significance to Schleiermacher's Über die Religion.11 And it remains a
powerful book still. But to those familiär with Otto's earlier work, the
continuity could be clearly discerned. This is particularly so with reference
to the religious a priori itself. To be sure, there are shifts and developments
in Otto's position at various times, but the notion of a religious a priori is
present, if only in embryo, in his earliest works.
In his edition of Schleidermacher's Über die Religion in 1899, he
remarks that 'the capacity for Intuition and feeling is for him the religious a
priori'.12 And the notion of a religious a priori is implicit in his assertion of
the autonomy of religion in Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht" in
1904, and in his critique of Wilhelm Wundt's Völkerpsychologie14 in 1910.
As applied to the comparative study of religions though, the religious a
priori becomes apparent for the first time in 1913 in a lecture devoted to the
relation between Buddhism and Christianity. Of parallel developments in
these two traditions, he writes,
Things which proceed so similarly in their historical development must be organized
according to laws of parallel peculiar to them, must more or less originate in impulses of
the human rational spirit, which are related to each other and belong in one category.15
And, shortly before this, a more theological expression of the same
sort can be found in Otto's first publication in the comparison of relig-
ions.16 Also, in 1913, of parallel developments in Christianity and Hindu-
ism, he suggests that they attest to 'the inner unity of the religious impulse
9
 The Idea of the Holy, p. xxi. See also R. Otto, Sünde und Urschuld (München: C. H. Beck,
1932), p. 190.
10
 F. Heiler, Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, vol. 79, 1926, maintains, for example, that with
Das Heilige something 'quite new' begins; and Ernst Troeltsch, 'Zur Religionsphilosophie',
Kant-Studien, vol. 23, 1919, p. 76 talks of a 'total about-face'.
11
 Quoted by P. Seifen, op. dt., p. 1.
12
 R. Otto, 'Rückwon' to F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck und Ruprecht, 1899), p. xxxix.
13
 R. Otto, Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904); English
translation, Naturalism and Religion (London: Williams and Norgate, 1909).
14
 R. Otto, 'Mythus und Religion in Wundt's Völkerpsychologie', Theologische Rundschau,
vol. 13, 1910, pp. 251—75, 293—305.
15
 R. Otto, 'Parallelen und Wertunterschiede im Christentum und Buddatum' [sie], p. 2
(Rudolf Otto Archiv, Religionskundliche Sammlung, Marburg, 351).
16
 See R. Otto, 'Parallelisms in the Development of Religion East and West', Transactions of
the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. 40, 1912, p. 158.
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in humanity in general'.17 Moreover, äs Friedrich Delekat reports, during
Otto's time at Göttingen — presumably the latter part of his time there —
Otto was already lecturing on material which was subsequently to be
incorporated in a more developed form in Das Heilige.™
The Friesian Connection
Sufficient has, I hope, been said to indicate that there are some
grounds for a closer examination of the influence of Otto's earlier work,
and especially the Kantianism of Fries, on Das Heilige. The philosophy of
Fries is virtually unknown to English-speaking scholars, and, I suspect is
unfamiliar to many German readers also. So let me now turn to a brief
outline of Fries's position, or at least those parts of it that are of relevance to
an understanding of Otto.
As is well known, according to Kant, experience is the product of the
given of sense experience and the elements contributed by the mind — the
spatio-temporal forms of Intuition and the categories of the understanding.
For Kant, the fact that our knowledge has a subjective a priori element is
sufficient to disprove its absolutely objective character. But here, Fries
disagrees. He maintains that knowledge of reality in itself is possible, in the
negative knowledge of rational faith, and in the positive knowledge af-
forded by intuitive feeling. Thus, in Fries's view, human understanding
may be divided in a three-fold way: scientific knowledge (Wissen), rational
faith (Glaube), and religio-aesthetic Intuition (Ahnung), each of which is an
independent but inter-related form of knowledge, although the latter two
are higher forms.19
The foundation for Fries's argument is laid in his discussion of the
nature of truth.20 According to this, truth cannot be defined in Kant's
idealist System äs the agreement of an idea with its object. For, on the one
hand, there is no means by which we can compare the object äs known with
the object independent of knowledge (for, apart from perception, there are
no checking procedures).21 Thus, Fries reasons, in perception we must have
immediate knowledge that there is a world independent of our perceptions.
And, on the other hand, truth äs customarily defined cannot explain our
knowledge of necessary truths. Thus, äs regards the validity of truths
known independently of experience, we must also have immediate know-
ledge. Truth, expressed in rational judgements depends therefore finally
17
 R. Otto, 'Parallelen der Religionsentwicklung', Frankfurter Zeitung, 31.3. and 1.4.1913,
p. 4.
18
 Fr. Delekat, 'Rudolf Otto und das Methodenproblem in der heutigen systematischen
Theologie', Die Christliche Welt, vol. 44, 1930, p. 4.
19
 See J.F. Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung (Göttingen: Öffentliches Leben, 1931),
pp.63f.
2C
 See ibid., pp. 19—30.
21
 See ibid., p. 35.
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upon 'the agreement of the judgement with the immediate knowledge of
reason on which it is based'.22 Moreover, although this immediate know-
ledge of reason can be laid bare by the empirical examination of our mental
processes, through what Fries calls an 'anthropological critique', it
nonetheless has its own criterion of truth, namely, a Wahrheitsgefühl — a
feeling of truth that is inescapable and irreducible.23
The content of this immediate knowledge of Reason is that of the
objective reality of Being and existence in general, that is, that there is an
objective world to be known. But further, in this immediate knowledge of
Reason is revealed the unity and necessity of everything there is: 'Not a
hotch-potch of disparate and dis-connected phenomena ... which would
be blind and senseless, a mere "rhapsody of perceptions"; not this but an
association of thorough and coherent interdependence'.24
Now according to Fries, the a priori categories of the understanding
articulate the only possible forms of the content of this immediate know-
ledge of Reason — the idea of universal unity and necessity — and
therefore, the categories give us knowledge of absolute reality. Kant
assumes we can have no real knowledge by means of the pure categories,
but only by their means when they are schematized by time (and space).25
In contrast to this, for Fries, the categories lose their objective validity and
are restricted and limited äs a result of this schematizing. And consequent-
ly, our knowledge of the world through the schematized categories is
incomplete and imperfect in comparison to the purely rational knowledge
of reality imbedded in our immediate knowledge of Reason and expressed
in the pure categories of the understanding.
In particular, Fries wants to argue that in the Ideas of Reason — God,
the soul, and freedom — which for Kant are at most regulative ideals in the
pursuit of scientific knowledge, we have a completely rational notion of
reality; and the realm of scientific knowledge is such that it allows of
transitions to this pure rational knowledge (Glaube). By applying to the
complete and imperfect temporally schematized categories an ideal
schematism by which they are completed, the Ideas of Reason — the soul,
freedom, and God — are able to be deduced directly.26
As R. F. Davidson comments:
... the restriction and limitation imposed by the data of sense-experience upon the
conceptual knowledge of the phenomenal world is removed and an ideal view of reality
äs a completely intelligible world of rational being is achieved.27
22
 Ibid., p. 29.
23
 See The Philosophy of Religion, pp.53, 58 f.
24
 Ibid., p. 78.
25
 N. Kemp Smith, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan, 1964)
pp.!86f.
26
 See, for instance, Otto's account of this, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 81—90.
27
 R. F. Davidson, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1947), p. 144. See also The Philosophy of Religion, pp.66f., 81.
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Thus, by negating or completing the temporally-schematized
categories (which themselves are negations or limitations of the pure
categories), we gain knowledge of absolute reality. Although for Fries (and
for Otto) this purely rational knowledge is higher than scientific know-
ledge, nevertheless, because the Ideas of Reason arise by negation we have
no positive knowledge of them. We know that they are, but we do not
know what they are. All we can do is deny the application of the limitations
of empirical existence to them.28. This rational but negative knowledge of
God is the source of one side of Otto's negative theology. For Otto was,
and remained, convinced that Fries had provided a valid rational proof of
God's existence. As late äs 1931, he was to write,
One of my critics once predicted that in time to come a more accurate 'psychological'
investigation would prove that the Idea of God is a fundamental element in our thought.
If this is taken, not äs referring to the specific content of the Christian idea of God, but
to the fundamental theistic conception of a real and primary unity transcending the
universe, then the Friesian philosophy may claim that it fulfils this prediction.29
But what then of the relationship between that which is known
through Glaube about objective reality and that known through Wissen
about the same objective reality which merely appears to us through the
manifold of sense? For Fries, 'knowledge of the Eternal in the finite is only
possible through pure feeling'.30 Through Ahndung^1, that is, religio-
aesthetic feeling, which like logical judgements is characterized by a Wahr-
heitsgefühl, it is revealed that the world of sense-perception is really
ordered in agreement with the principles of rational faith: 'the world of
Faith here manifests itself in the world of Knowledge by means of
"Ahnung" .. 32 And further, it is through Ahndung that religion arises.33
For piety may be identified with the enthusiasm, devotion, and seif-
surrender to God which result from it, and the consciousness of eternal
destiny, of good and evil, of sin and responsibility which are ineluctably
connected to it. And because religious knowledge is grounded in Ahndung,
all religious assertions are mere approximations; Ahndung, although it can
be positively feit, 'is utterly incapable of being analysed and is absolutely
proof against presentation in conceptual form'.34
28
 Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, p. 122.
29
 'Anmerkungen Rudolf Ottos zu der englischen Übersetzung der Kantisch-Fries'schen
Religionsphilosophie: The Philosophy of Religion, London 193 . H.W. Schütte, op. dt.,
p. 124.
30
 Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, p. 175.
31
 'Ahndung' is somewhat archaic usage for what is rendered in modern German by the term
'Ahnung'. In Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie Otto uses 'Ahnung'; but in Das
Heilige and subsequent works, he reverts to the use of 'Ahndung'.
32
 The Philosophy of Religion, p. 101. See also, pp. 141—4.
33
 Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, p. 235.
34
 The Philosophy of Religion, p. 133.
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The Rational and the Non-Rational
Friesian idealism of the sort summarized above is the framework of
Otto's later theory of religion, and it remains to spell out the connections in
more detail. Before doing so, however, let me enter a caveat, for I do not
want to be taken äs suggesting that there are no differences between the
religious a priori in Das Heilige and the more general a priori suggested in
Otto's work on Fries. Indeed, for some critics, it must be admitted, these
differences are decisive ones.35 Be that äs it may, I want to suggest that the
foundation remains the same, even if the structure built upon it differs.
Thus, if we consider the rational side of the divine, knowledge of God,
for Fries, is an aspect of the general a priori knowledge of human reason; so
also with the knowledge of the rational side of the Holy in Das Heilige.
Further, if we turn to the non-rational aspect of the divine, the numinous
experience is, like Ahndung, a unique kind of experience and the final
source of all religion. In short, Ahndung and the numinous experience are
formally identical. Materially though, they differ. According to Fries,
Ahndung has no autonomous meaning or value. It serves merely to unite
the realms of faith and knowledge. By contrast, in Otto's later work,
religion comprises not only a unique form of experience (and one to be
distinguished from aesthetic experience) but also has a completely auto-
nomous meaning and value. For the meaning and value of the numinous
experience is determined by analysis of the Contents of the religious
consciousness (though this too is Friesian in method because it is can-
thropologicar). We can place the shift away from the Friesian position
during or shortly after Otto's engagement with the study of religions in
their living contexts, namely in late 1912 or early 1913 when it became clear
that the facts of the religious consciousness did not tally with the a priori
mold into which Fries had placed them.36
It is important also to note that the references to the Friesian philoso-
phy are few and far between in Otto's later work. And it cannot be denied
that his commitment to the specifics of Friesianism becomes less forthright.
Still, after the publication of Das Heilige, indeed äs late äs 1931, Otto
continued to affirm his commitment to the basic position of Fries37; and it
35
 See, for example, S. Holm, 'Apriori und Urphänomen bei Rudolf Otto', E. Benz (ed.)
Rudolf Otto's Bedeutung für die Religionswissenschaft und die Theologie Heute (Leiden:
Brill, 1971), pp. 70—83.
36
 Though the outlines of his later account of the non-rational side of religion can be detected
clearly already in 1910 in his critique of Wilhelm Wundt. See especially, R. Otto, 'Mythus
und Religion in Wundt's Völkerpsychologie', Theologische Rundschau, vol. 13, 1910, pp.
201,303, 304 f.
37
 See, for example, R. F. Davidson, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 134; 'Anmerkungen Rudolf Ottos zu der englischen
Übersetzung der Kantisch-Fries'schen Religionsphilosophie: The Philosophy of Religion,
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behoves us therefore to try to see the nature of this later commitment more
clearly. Let me turn therefore to Das Heilige in order to tease out its
Friesian framework.
Generally, we identify the rational with thinking and the non-rational
with feeling. But for Otto, the application of the terms 'rational' and 'non-
rationaP is determined not so much by reference to thinking and feeling äs
by reference to their objects. That is to say, 'rational' and 'non-rational' are
primarily predicates of objects. Thus, whether or not an object is in any
particular instance thought or feit, it is nonetheless a rational object to the
extent that it can be thought conceptually.38 And by contrast, whether or
not an object is feit or thought, it is a non-rational object insofar äs it cannot
be brought 'into the domain of the conceptual understanding'.39 In short, in
Kantian terms, a rational object is one which can be thought under the a
priori categories of the understanding; a non-rational object, one which
cannot be so thought.
The referent of religion, the Holy, is for Otto both a rational and a
non-rational object. On the one hand, the Holy (or God) can be thought of
äs a rational object because possessed of a rational nature. Where deity is
characterized by the attributes spirit, reason, purpose, goodwill, supreme
power, unity, and selfhood, it can in some sense (and there is a lack of
clarity in Otto's argument at this point) he brought into the sphere of
understanding since it is 'thus thought of by analogy with our human
nature of reason and personality'.40
But there is an important difference between these attributes when
applied to human nature on the one hand, and to the divine nature on the
other. That such attributes are only to be predicated of the nature of deity
analogously is due to the fact, Otto maintains, that they are thought of äs
'completed' when applied to God in contrast to our awareness of them in
ourselves äs 'qualified by restriction and limitation'.41 Now Otto is clearly
drawing, if only loosely, on the Friesian deduction of the Ideas of Reason
by the negation of the limitations imposed upon them by temporal
schematism. Accordingly, his argument can be constructed äs follows: both
God and human beings are rational objects, and the attributes of human
nature are applicable to deity. Since human beings are conceived of äs
having spirit, reason, purpose, and so on, they are rational objects, though
under the limitations of empirical existence. God is not an object that can be
London 193 , H.W. Schütte, op.at., p. 123. Here, Otto remarks, 'a combination of the
principles of Fries with those of De Wette and Schleiermacher seems to offer a solution,
which, although it does not appear to me äs a final oracular Statement, has given me a
provisional Archimedean, a ground that I can still rest upon'.
38
 The Idea of the Holy, p . l .
39
 Ibid., p. 59.
4C
 Ibid., p.l .
41
 Ibid., p. l .
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thought under such limitations; and consequently, such attributes may be
thought of äs applicable to God only where such limitations are removed.
In short, the divine has a rational side which can be negatively known.
The Holy is also, and pre-eminently so, a non-rational object. Indeed,
Otto wants to suggest that the rational attributes, far from exhausting the
idea of deity, 'in fact are only directly about and of validity for a Non-
rational'42, that is inaccessible to conceptual thought and can only be feit.
Now feeling can refer to both rational and non-rational objects.43 Insofar äs
feeling is referrable to an object that can be identified in precise conceptual
terms, it comes within the domain of the rational, but when evoked by a
non-rational feeling, qualitatively unique. And while there are analogies
between non-rational and rational feelings, the uniqueness and irreducibili-
ty of the former is due to their being evoked by a non-rational object.44
Otto's argument for the sui-generis nature of religious feelings is grounded
therefore, in large part, in their being intimately related to the apprehension
of a sui-generis non-rational object; and his psychological comparison of
the religious consciousness and the rational consciousness presupposes it.
Further, religious feeling is cognitive; the numinous experience gives
knowledge of the transcendent divine. In a clear appeal to Fries, Otto
writes,
We employ the expression 'feeling of the supra-mundane', and thereby connect it to an
old, traditional use of the word 'feeling' which is nonetheless quite definitely present in
our language even today, e. g. if we speak of 'feeling of truth' [Wahrheitsgefühl]. We
mean here by feeling not subjective states but an act of reason itself, a mode of knowing
which is to be distinguished from the mode of knowing through the understanding.4S
Otto's account of religious language reflects this incipient Friesianism.
Like the Ideas of Reason and Ahndung, the rational and non-rational sides
of the Holy can only be spoken of negatively or by analogy. All talk about
the non-rational core of religion falls short of its non-rational referent.
Only through the use of ideograms that symbolically and evocatively
indicate it can it be spoken of.46 But, like Ahndung, the numinous experi-
ence is a positive one, and only in the positive feeling of the numen can the
individual become aware that such language has an application.47
42
 Das Heilige (\9\7), p. 2.
43
 The Idea of the Holy, pp. 58 f.
44
 Ibid., p. 59. See also R. Otto, Gottheit und Gottheiten der Arier (Gießen: A. Töpelmann,
1932), p. 4.
45
 R. Otto, Das Gefühl des Überweltlichen (Sensus Numinis) (München: C.H. Beck, 1932),
p.327. See also, H.W. Schütte, op. dt., p. 124, where Otto remarks of the translation of
'Gefühl' by 'emotion'. '"Gefühl" can mean a form of cognizance in an unconceptional or
preconceptional (sie) way. In this sense 'Gefühl' is acknowledged by Fries äs a possible
source of cognizances apart from sensual or conceptual cognizances'.
46
 The Idea of the Holy, p. 60.
47
 See Ibid., pp. 13, 30, 39.
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The a priori Category of the Holy
Empirical religions then are complexes of unique rational (because
completed) elements, and unique non-rational (because evoked by a non-
rational object) elements. Such complexes arise, according to Otto, from a
'category of Interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion'48
— the category of the Holy (die Kategorie des Heiligen). Both the elements
which go to make up the Holy are purely a priori; the Holy is 'a combined
complex category'.49 What exactly does Otto intend by these terms?
Otto fails to develop at any length his notion of the rational a priori.
And partly because of this, partly because of the importance of the non-
rational a priori, it has received little attention in the critical literature. But if
we Interpret what there is in line with Otto's Friesian background, we can
get some idea of what he means by it. It follows from what we have already
said about the term 'rational object'. Thus, and without putting too fine a
point on it, the content of the rational a priori is determined by analogy to
human nature, when the limitations imposed by reason on human attributes
are removed and they are thought of äs completed, äs made absolute. The
rational elements of deity are a priori because they can be generated in
Friesian manner by the completion of the analogous aspects of human
personality. They are not derived from any sensuous experience but from
reason alone. The rational a priori is analogous to Friesian Glaube, the
content of the idea of God being filled up, so to say, with rational content.50
With the non-rational element in the category of the Holy, we are also
dealing with an a priori', and in this case, one which lies deeper in the seif
than the rational a priori and is 'the ultimate and highest part of our
nature'.51 We are referred, writes Otto, "to that which mysticism has
rightly named the fundus animae, the 'bottom* or 'ground of the soul'
(Seelengrund)".52 And it is identical with faith, that is, with what makes
possible the appropriation of grace.53 More importantly, for our purposes,
Otto goes on to appeal to the Kantian dictum: 'But though all our
knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out
of experience''.54 And several paragraphs later, he continues,
The proof that in the numinous we have to do with purely a priori cognitive elements is
to be reached by introspection and a critical examination of reason such äs Kant
instituted.55
Now both of these passages raise the question of Otto's relation to the
Kantian philosophy, and a consideration of them should enable us to see
the connection to the Kantian tradition much more clearly.
Ibid., p. 5. « Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., p. 112. 53 See Ibid., p. 104.
See Ibid., p. 112. * Ibid., p. 113.
Ibid., p. 36. 53 Ibid., p. 113.
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In the first place then, the appeal to Kant in the first passage above is
not made specifically with reference to the Kantian notion of the a priori.
The appeal to Kant at this point is essentially and only an affirmation of the
Kantian doctrine of transcendental idealism, that is, that we can never know
things äs they are in themselves, but only things äs they appear to us by
virtue of the constitutive and determinative powers of our minds. the
doctrine that the world of everyday experience is an 'appearance' is
fundamental to all Otto's theorizing.56
It is true that, äs we have seen, Otto wants to overcome the epis-
temological dualism of Kant by means of the Friesian notions of Glaube
and Ahndung: and thereby to establish the autonomous validity of religion.
But its positive validity can only be established when nothing counts
decisively against the possihility of its validity. And the appeal to Kant is
precisely to this end. For the basic doctrine of transcendental idealism
guarantees that there is no necessary incompatibility between a scientific
and a religious world view; and at the same time, justifies the rejection of
naturalistic and reductionist accounts of religion. It makes logically possible
the claim that, though religion may have its point of origin in experience, it
can only arise through the actualization of the universal human capacity for
numinous experience, that is, the religious a priori.
The second passage referring to Kant quoted above also gives the
impression that Otto is working specifically on Kantian lines. But the first
edition of Das Heilige makes it clear that Otto has not Kant but Fries in
mind. According to the first edition, the proof that numinous experience
contains a priori elements is to be reached by 'anthropological critique*
(anthropologische Kritik)57 — a certain reference to Pries's method of
introspective analysis, and an expression replaced by 'introspection and a
critical examination of reason such äs Kant instituted' in later editions. In
both cases the meaning remains the same. Through introspection, that is,
through analysis of the contents of the religious consciousness, a realization
of the qualitative uniqueness of religious feelings reveals their a priori
nature.58
We can, then, discern a certain circularity in Otto's argument. For on
the one hand, he does imply that the qualitative uniqueness of religious
feelings is due to their being evoked by a non-rational object; and on the
other, that their introspectively-discerned qualitative uniqueness points to
their cognitivity and a priority. Still, these aspects of the numinous experi-
ence — the qualitative uniqueness of religious feelings, their cognitive
character, and their immediate connection to a non-rational object — do
56
 See, for example, Naturalism and Religion, p. 69. See also Th. Siegfried, 'Theologie als
Religionswissenschaft', Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 19, 1938, pp. 16—45.
57
 Das Heilige (1917), p. 120.
58
 See The Idea of the Holy, p. 113.
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count against the argument that Otto's use of the term 'a priori' is so wide
'that there would hardly remain any mental phenomenon which was not a
priori .^ For they are (purportedly) qualitatively unique and therefore a
priori because, unlike any other mental phenomenon, they are related to the
apprehension of a unique object, namely, the numen. In sum therefore,
both the rational and non-rational elements of the category of the Holy are
a priori-, the incipient Kantian tradition is reflected through a Friesian
prism.
Schematization
Although the non-rational elements in the religious a priori are the
foundation of all religion, religion in the füll sense is only present where
both rational and non-rational elements are intimately combined.60 As an
apparent explanation of the relationship of these elements and of their
union in the one category, Otto introduces the term Schematization'
(Schematisierung). The rational elements of the Holy schematize the non-
rational numinous elements.
It is extremely difficult to be certain äs to exactly what Otto intends by
the use of this term. Virtually all commentators on Das Heilige are agreed
that his account is obscure and, äs Bernard Häring points out, Otto's
'theory of the "schematization of the numinous by the rational-moral" has
met with almost universal criticism'.61
Otto first introduces the concept of schematization in his discussion of
what he calls 'the law of the association of feelings and ideas', a notion that
is important for his theory of the evolution of religion. In some cases, he
argues, the associations between feelings are 'mere conjunctions or chance
connexions according to laws of purely external analogy'62, and conse-
59
 H.J. Paton, The Modern Predicament (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 136. See also
F. K. Feigel, 'Das Heilige': Kritische Abhandlung über Rudolf Ottos gleichnamiges Buch
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1948), selections reprinted in C. Colpe (ed.) Die
Diskussion um das Heilige (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), p. 402.
60
 See for example, The Idea of the Holy, p. 109.
61
 B. Häring, '"Das Heilige" Rudolf Ottos in der neueren Kritik', Geist und Leben, vol.24,
1951, p. 66. See also J. Geyser, Intellekt oder Gemüt? (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder &
Co., 1921), selections reprinted in C. Colpe (ed.), op. dt., pp. 319f.; W. Baetke, Das
Heilige im Germanischen (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1942); H. E. Eisenhuth,
Der Begriff des Irrationalen als philosophisches Problem (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und
Ruprecht, 1931), pp. 8—22; P. Seifert, op. dt., pp. 77—83; R. F. Davidson, op. dt.y pp.
187—92; H.J. Paton, op. cit., pp. 135—9; J. Wach, Types of Religious Experience (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 222; J. Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 63; J.P. Reeder, 'The Relation of the
Moral and the Numinous in Otto's Notion of the Holy', G. Outka and J. P. Reeder (eds.)
Religion and Morality, (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor, 1973), pp. 225—92. This last-
named essay is the best account available in English on schematization at the time of writing.
I am indebted to it at a number of points.
62
 The Idea of the Holy, p. 45.
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quently, such associations are not permanent ones. However, he goes on,
in the case of religious feeling, we find it 'in permanent connexion with
other feelings which are conjoined to it in accordance with this principle of
association'63, a connection 'according to principles of essential correspond-
ence>64. And according to Otto, Kantian schematism rests on just such an
essential correspondence; so also, 'the relation of the rational to the non-
rational element in the idea of the holy ... is just such a one of "schematiza-
tion'".65
There is certainly an unexplained leap in Otto's argument; for he
moves from talk of the 'association of ideas' and the 'association of feelings'
to that of an essential correspondence between religious ideas and religious
feelings. Still, ignoring this hiatus, it seems clear that at the very least Otto
is maintaining that the rational side of the Holy corresponds fundamentally
with the non-rational side, and this, not merely when each is taken äs a
whole, but also when they are considered according to the specific elements
which comprise them.66 And therefore, because the non-rational is the core
of religion, all religious doctrine can be seen äs the result of the Operation of
the rational upon the non-rational. But this much can be said without
invoking the term 'schematization'; so it remains unclear how this term
serves to illuminate this, and whether it is to be understood in anything like
a Kantian sense.
We may recall that, according to Kant, the pure categories have
objective validity only when they are schematized. And the crucial function
of a Kantian Schema is that, because it is, äs it were, closer to sense
experience than the pure category, it makes possible its application to the
objects of experience. If Otto were developing his concept of schematiza-
tion on the pattern of the Kantian one, then schematization would be the
means by which the non-rational a priori might be applied to the object of
the experience, that is, the numen. And some commentators have suggested
that this is the function which Otto intends schematization to serve.67
However, there are a number of reasons why this cannot be Otto's
meaning.
First, Otto has no need to interpose a Schema between the category of
the Holy and its object. On Friesian grounds, we have seen that for Otto
knowledge of the object is immediately given in numinous experience. And
a rational Schema, or rather rational ideas serving äs Schemas, are clearly
unlikely candidates to link non-rational feeling to its non-rational object.
63
 Ibid., p. 45 (my italics).
M
 Das Heilige (München; C.H. Beck, 1963), p. 61. Das Heilige (1917), p. 49 reads 'nach
Prinzipien innerer legitimer Verwandtschaft und Zugehörigkeit'. See also The Idea of the
Holy, p. 45.
65
 The Idea of the Holy, p. 45.
66
 See/ ., pp. 140 f.
67
 See, for example, H.J. Paton, op. cit., pp. 138 f.
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Second, whereas for Kant, the 'non-rational' Schema schematizes the
rational category, for Otto the reverse obtains: the rational elements are
said to schematize the non-rational. If Otto intends schematization äs a
means of apprehending the numinous object, then either he has misunder-
stood Kant, or he has deliberately misused the Kantian concept, or he uses
'schematization' for a different purpose. There is no reason to accept the
first alternative, for Otto clearly understands what Kant meant by schemat-
ism.68 Nor can he be said illegitimately to use the Kantian notion, because
he needs no intermediary between the non-rational a priori and the object
apprehended through its Operation. So we can only conclude that schemati-
zation serves a different (albeit related) purpose.
The key to the link between Otto and Kant at this point lies in the
nature of the objects to be grasped by the respective schematized categories.
For Kant, only a schematized category is capable of application to an object
of sense experience. So also for Otto, only a schematized category is
adequate to the elements of the divine. For Otto, the Holy is the non-
rational numinous core 'completely permeated and saturated with elements
signifying rationality, purpose, personality, morality'.69 So Otto's purpose
in using the term 'schematization' is to assert that the relation between the
rational and non-rational elements of religion is such that they are adequate
to its object, and that the category of the Holy is adequate to its object —
the non-rational mysterium and the rational Absolute and the characteris-
tics pertaining to each. In other words, Otto wishes to emphasize the
essential correspondence between the elements of the religious a priori and
to assert that this essential correspondence of the two is demanded by the
nature of the object to which they apply.
This essential correspondence is further reinforced by Otto's conten-
tion that 'their inward and necessary union' is itself a priori. And of
particular significance in his discussion of the a priori connection of the two
is its relation to feeling. For Pries's notion of a Wahrheitsgefühl again
clearly underlies it. Thus, for example, of the process by which the non-
rational takes on rational elements, Otto remarks that it is feit äs something
axiomatic, something whose inner necessity we feel to be self-evident.7C
Now in the first edition of Das Heilige, Otto argues that
... the inward self-evidence of this process is in itself a problem which we cannot at all
solve without accepting an obscure a priori knowledge of the necessity of the synthesis
of these moments.71
And in later editions, he maintains that the problem cannot be solved
'without accepting an obscure "synthetic a priori knowledge" of the
68
 See, for example, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 56 f.
69
 The Idea of the Holy, p. 109.
70
 Ibid., p. 136.
71
 Das Heilige (1917), p. 140. So also ibid., p. 137.
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essential correspondence of these moments'.72 The understanding of what
Otto means by the a priori connection of these elements turns them on the
nature of the problem which the assertion of it putatively solves.
In all editions, Otto goes on to point out that the connection between
the rational and non-rational elements is not a logically necessary one. That
is to say, it is a synthetic connection and not an analytic one; the rational
attributes of the divine do not logically entail its non-rational ones, and
vice-versa. The problem consists therefore in the fact that the felt-certainty
demands a necessary, that is, a priori connection between the elements,
whereas their respective natures point to it äs merely a synthetic one. To
accommodate these two conflicting demands, the one necessitated by
feeling, the other by their logically-unrelated natures, Otto maintains in the
later editions that we have a synthetic a priori knowledge of their essential
connection. In other words, we know that these elements, although having
a synthetic connection, are nonetheless necessarily connected. And this too
is what Otto means in the first edition, though it is perhaps clearer in its
later revised form. However that may be, the crucial aspect of the discus-
sion is that the justification for the a priori connection of the elements is the
felt-certainty of ity the feeling of truth that they are so connected. And i t is
crucial to Otto's whole theory of religion that they should be connected in
this way. For it is only by an a priori connection of the two that Otto's
claims that both the rational and non-rational are crucial to religion, and
that all true religious doctrines must of necessity manifest their intimate
connection, can be certified.
ConcLusion
By way of conclusion, let me sum up the general thrust of my
argument. I have tried to show both the continuities and discontinuities
between Otto's mature philosophy of religion and the Kantian tradition. In
particular, I have argued that there is a continuity between the framework
underlying Das Heilige and Otto's earlier commitment to Kantianism äs
mediated to him through the work of Jakob Fries. Such discontinuity äs
there is results, not from a change in Otto's basic philosophical approach,
but rather from the extension of the application of this approach to religious
data supplied by his encounter with living religions.
If this is substantially correct, then Otto's theory of religion is an
important forerunner of contemporary attempts to come to terms with the
problem of the pluralism of religions by formulating and resolving it in a
Kantian way.73 Let me not appear to be suggesting that I am endorsing
72
 Das Heilige (1963), p. 165.
73
 See, for example, J. Hick, Towards a Philosophy of Religious Pluralism', Neue Zeitschrift
für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophiey vol. 22, 1980, pp. 131—49.
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Otto's account. For it is too closely wedded to Friesianism to gain a tout
court acceptance in a contemporary philosophical and theological climate
unsympathetic to the intricacies of idealist Systems. Still, what one does
want to say, is that if, äs I suspect, one way forward to the formulation, and
the resolution too, of the problem of religious pluralism lies in the adoption
of a Kantian structural framework, then an appreciation of both the
strengths and weaknesses of Otto's position is a crucial prolegomenon to it.
SUMMARY
Im Problem der Verbindung von Rudolf Ottos Kantianismus mit den Hauptgedanken
seines Buches »Das Heilige« bleibt noch Vieles ungelöst.
Meine These ist, daß es eine Kontinuität gibt zwischen Ottos voll entwickelter Reli-
gionsphilosophie und seinem früheren Neo-Friesianismus, und daß diese Kontinuität ent-
scheidend ist für ein tieferes Verständnis seines Werkes.
Jegliche Diskontinuität aber zwischen jenen beiden Entwicklungsstadien resultiert nicht
aus einem Wechsel in Ottos philosophischer Position, sondern aus seiner lebendigen Begeg-
nung mit östlichen Religionen.
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